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South China Sea has become a dispute for the last five decades. Several countries, 
involving China and some member states of ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations), have overlapping claims on this area. Its naturally rich resources, 
including fisheries, oil and gas, have become an attractive economic proposition for 
these states. Some observers assume the South China Sea dispute is both complex and 
complicated as the claims are not only territorial but also historical in nature. This 
suggests that the dispute necessitates more time and further efforts in order to 
facilitate some form of resolution. Although China and ASEAN have agreed a 
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, China has 
persistently refused to relinquish its claims to this strategically placed resource. This 
may signalize the failure of ASEAN’s strategy to ‘pour oil on troubled waters’. 
Additionally, it may well fail to bring China and its members to achieving a measure 
of resolution regarding this dispute; thereby failing to reach consensus regarding the 
exploitation of this valuable resource.  
 
Introduction 
In July 2012, the Chinese government approved the formal establishment of a military 
garrison in Sansha, a remote island 220 miles from its southernmost province. Sansha 
is located in the vicinity of Paracel Islands, one of disputed South China Sea Islands. 
By enacting this approval, China have emphasized their previous policy in creating 
Sansha as their administrative base for the whole South China Sea area; including the 
disputed territories of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Although there 
are no apparent further details providing data such as timing and numbers of military 
deployment, the approval has subsequently provoked the United States, Vietnam and 
the Philippines to voice their concerns.3 
The rising tension in the South China Sea has been the result of a dispute 
primarily contested by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei for decades; and it 
is therefore set to escalate. Vietnam has specifically protested against China's decision 
to establish the administrative city. In the meantime, diplomatic tensions are also high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	   The	   paper	   is	   presented	   in	   the	   3rd	   Convention	   of	   Indonesian	   Association	   of	   International	  Relations,	  in	  Universitas	  Muhamadiyah	  Malang,	  12	  October	  2012.	  2	  	   The	  writer	  is	  lecturer	  at	  Department	  of	  International	  Relations,	  Faculty	  of	  Social	  and	  Political	  Sciences,	  Christian	  University	  of	  Indonesia.	  	  3	  	   “China	   approves	   military	   garrison	   for	   disputed	   islands”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐asia-­‐china-­‐18949941	  in	  7	  September	  2012,	  22.31	  pm	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between China and the Philippines after a standoff over the Scarborough Shoal, an 
area that is contested and claimed by both sides. Moreover, the disputes over resource-
rich locations within the vicinity of the South China Sea, has sparked controversy at 
an ASEAN regional forum. Significantly, for the first time in its 45-year history, the 
10 state-members were unable to establish a consensus on the construction of a 
closing statement in ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh, July 2012.4 
Therefore, this paper will analyze the role of ASEAN in the South China Sea 
dispute. This paper primarily examines ASEAN’s ability to resolve the problematic 
issue due to the imbalance created by some of its members’ involvement in this 
growing conflict with China. Although there has been a Declaration on Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and a potential draft of Code of Conduct 
(COC) concerning management on the South China Sea, ASEAN remains failed to 
deter China from its aggressive stance. In addition to ASEAN’s prior failure to 
construct a closing statement, the likelihood exists that any consensus regarding this 
dispute will become increasingly remote. This paper therefore suggests that ASEAN 
alone may not have the capacity to formulate a viable consensus or resolve this long-
standing dispute.  
To analyze and evaluate the above-stated issue, will necessitate that the 
following discussion be divided into three sections. The first section will describe the 
history of South China Sea dispute, recent developments and China’s policy towards 
this area. The second section will focus on the reaction from states that strongly 
opposed to Chinese claims, with attention directed specifically towards Vietnam and 
the Philippines. This will be followed subsequently by an analysis on how ASEAN 
enabled efforts to resolve the issue, whilst some of its member states have ongoing 
conflict with China. This section will also examine the possibility exists that ASEAN 
can secure some form of resolution that is mutually acceptable by all participants. In 
the conclusion, this paper will include some recommendations with a view to facilitate 
strategies allowing the ASEAN member states to achieve a favorable outcome.  
 
Understanding China’s Claim on South China Sea 
China's sovereignty over the Spratly and other island groups in the South China Sea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 	  “ASEAN	   summit	   fails	   to	   agree	   on	   concluding	   joint	   statement,”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/1213369/1/.html	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was not challenged until the arrivals of invading powers. There are many classic 
Chinese poems and inscriptions that were written from Xia Dynasty (21st - 16th 
centuries B.C.) to the Qing Dynasty (1644 - 1911) as tribute to the South China Sea. 
This profoundly proves that China has established and maintained her sovereignty 
over these island chains by ways of discovery, naming, mapping, patrol and control, 
public and private use, administrative allocation of jurisdiction, and other 
manifestations of authority throughout history.5  
China arguably enjoyed peaceful and uninterrupted control over the South China 
Sea Islands and the surrounding waters until the 1930's. It was then France in 1933 
that initially seized the opportunity to occupy several islands in the South China Sea. 
However, Japan replaced the French government and took over the entire South China 
Sea chain of islands in 1939. Japan accordingly placed these Islands under the 
jurisdiction of Taiwan, which was administered by Japan. Following Japan's 
unconditional surrender to allied forces, in 1947 the Nationalist China Government 
sought to regain the possession of all islands in the South China Sea, by publishing a 
map that displayed nine bars enclosing almost its entire expanse.6  
In 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, Japan legally renounced its claim over 
the South China Sea Islands. However, a year later, Japan surrendered all of her right, 
title and claim to the Republic of China (Taiwan), by the bilateral Japan-Taiwan 
Treaty of Taipei.  Along with Japan at the San Francisco Peace Conference, France 
(and later Vietnam), asserted their claims to the Spratlys and the Paracels. 
Notwithstanding, the Soviet Union recognized the full sovereignty of Chinese 
People’s Republic over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.7  Thereby, in September 1958 
Declaration on the Territorial Sea, Beijing included the Spratlys, the Paracels and 
Macclesfield Bank among People’s Republic of China’s territories, to which the 
twelve-mile breadth of the territorial sea applied.”8  
In mid 1950s, a Filipino group of marine educator led by Tomas Cloma claimed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	   Jianming	  Shen,	   “International	  Law	  Rules	  and	  Historical	  Evidence	  Supporting	  China's	  Title	   to	  the	   South	   China	   Sea	   Islands,”	   in	  Hastings	   International	   &	   Comparative	   Law	   Review,	  vol.	   40,	  1997,	  pp.	  15-­‐17.	  	  6	  	   Ibid.,	   pp.	   40-­‐43.	   See	   also	  Rodolfo	   C.	   Severino,	   “ASEAN	   and	   the	   South	   China	   Sea,”	   in	   Security	  
Challenges,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  2,	  Winter	  2010,	  pp.	  37-­‐47.	  7	  	   Jiangming	   Shen,	   “China’s	   Sovereignty	   over	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   Islands:	   A	   Historical	  Perspective,”	  in	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  Internasional	  Law,	  2002,	  p.	  99.	   8	  	   Severino,	  op.	  cit.	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to have discovered the Kalayaan Islands, which is located in Spratly area. Yet, the first 
official claim by the Philippine government over the islands came in 1971, mainly in 
responding Taiwanese forces stationed on Itu Aba Island. When a Philippine fishing 
vessel was being fired by Taiwanese, the Philippine government reacted by protesting 
the incident and then asserted legal title by annexing islands in the Spratly group 
based on Cloma's claim. Subsequently, in 1978 the Marcos government formally 
annexed the archipelago to the Philippines and placed it under the administration of 
Palawan province.9  
Meanwhile, Vietnam began to occupy some islands in both Spratly and Paracel 
Islands, which based in right of cession from a French claim to the islands first made 
in the 1933. In any event, Vietnam moved in 1975 to secure its claim to possession of 
the Spratlys when it occupied thirteen islands of the group. In September 1989 
Vietnam occupied three more islets, and has since taken at least nine additional 
atolls.10 Contesting claims accelerated in late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, as Malaysia 
and Brunei joined the occupations. These newly emerged claims inevitably led to an 
increasing tension between claimants. In fact, there were several military encounters 
occurred between China and Vietnam as well as China and the Philippines.  
The Chinese government confirms that her possession over the South China Sea 
Islands and the adjacent waters are backed not only by historical facts but also by 
international Law of Sea.11 Therefore, as stated in her 2010 White Defence Paper, the 
Chinese authorities legalize all measures to “safeguard its national sovereignty, 
security and interests of national development” in their claimed-territorial in South 
China Sea. Like other’s national defence forces, China People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) is mainly tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of 
its lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights 
and interests, and maintain its security interests in space.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	   Christopher	  C.	  Joyner,	  “The	  Spratly	  Islands	  Dispute	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea:	  Problems,	  Policies,	  and	  Prospects	  for	  Diplomatic	  Accommodation“	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	  http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-­‐pdfs/cbmapspratly.pdf.	  10	  	   John	  C.	  Baker,	  et	  al.,	   “Cooperative	  Monitoring	  Using	  Commercial	  Observation	  Satellites:	  Case	  Study	  of	  a	  Transparency	  Regime	  for	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  Disputes,”	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  George	  Washington	  University	  Space	  Policy	  Institute,	  February	  1999.	  11	  	  Lowell	   B.	   Bautista,	   “Thinking	   Outside	   the	   Box:	   The	   South	   China	   Sea	   Issue	   and	   the	   United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (Options,	  Limitations	  and	  Prospects),	  in	  Philippines	  
Law	  Journal,	  Vol.	  81,	  No.	  4,	  2006,	  pp.	  699-­‐731.	  12	   China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2010,	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	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In other words, China utilizes any efforts to proclaim her “complete 
sovereignty” over South China Sea Islands. On one hand, China conducted diplomatic 
mechanisms not only with Vietnam, but also with ASEAN regarding the South China 
Sea management. The dialogue between ASEAN and China in 1994 has signalized a 
great transformation in China policy. That revolution was, the conversion from 
unilateralism to multilateralism in the South China Sea.13 Furthermore, ASEAN-China 
Dialogue has resulted in the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC) in 2002.  
On the other hand, by establishing its military presence on the Paracel group of 
islands recently, China wishes to reinforce its claims and ensure that the others are 
ousted from the region. China’s decision to post about 1,200 PLA soldiers in Sansha 
City, in July 2012 clearly explains its policy to protect and secure her sovereignty. 
This act performs that China wished to send a message to all other contenders that 
while it would wish for a diplomatic solution, it would react militarily to defend its 
position in the South China Sea.14 Essentially, this emphasizes what Al Capone says, 
“You can get further with a kind word and a gun than you can with just a kind 
word.”15  
 
Responses from Other Claimants  
The South China Sea is a huge area covering nearly 3.5 million square kilometres, 
where countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are in 
serious contention. There are at least two arguments to trigger such countries claim 
the occupation of the region. Firstly, it is due to its wealth natural resources. Besides 
fisheries and other sea products, oil and gas deposits have been found in most of the 
littoral countries of the South China Sea. The region has proven oil reserves estimated 
at about 7.5 billion barrels, and oil production is currently over 1.3 million barrels per 
day. Moreover, natural gas might be the most abundant hydrocarbon resource in the 
South China Sea. Most of the hydrocarbon fields explored in the South China Sea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-­‐03/31/c_13806851_5.htm	  13	  	   Jason	  Ray	  Hutchison,	  “The	  South	  China	  Sea:	  Confusion	  in	  Complexity”	  can	  be	  accessed	  from	  http://pdf-­‐world.net/pdf/429137/The-­‐South-­‐China-­‐Sea-­‐Confusion-­‐in-­‐Complexity-­‐pdf.php	  14	  	   R.S.	   Kalha,	   “China’s	   Forward	   Policy	   in	   South	   China	   Sea,”	   can	   be	   accessed	   in	  http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasForwardPolicyintheSouthChinaSea_RSKalha_300712	  15	  	   “The	  Untouchables”	  accessed	  from	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094226/quotes	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regions of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
contain natural gas.16  
Secondly, the South China Sea is a significant medium of transportation and 
exchange. The main East Asian economic power such as China, Japan and South 
Korea, are heavily dependent on the safety and security of the South China Sea- 
lanes.17 Nearly 60,000 vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca toward South China 
Sea region carrying various cargoes every year.18 According to the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, approximately 30% of the world’s trade and 50% of the U.S 
oil products pass through this waters.19 The report also says that nearly 15 million 
barrels oil per day flow from the Persian Gulf, go through the Strait of Malacca to 
Japan, South Korea, China, and other Pacific Rim states, including the U.S.  
As previously mentioned, China exercises all efforts including her military 
capability to protect her sovereignty in the South China Sea and its adjacent waters 
territorial. China’s defence strategy ultimately allows its PLA to build its naval, air 
and missile forces. In order to modernize her military, Chinese government has 
procured nuclear-powered submarines, frigates, amphibious landing craft warships, 
fighter-bombers, as well as destroyers since 2000. 20  These destroyers are also 
completed with supersonics and anti-ship cruise missiles. In 2010, China bought 15 S-
300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia, which have a range of more than 150 km and 
travel at minimum 2 km per second.21 Moreover, China has just launched its first 
aircraft carrier in 201022 and obviously China will further continue its military 
procurement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 South	   China	   Sea	   Oil	   and	   Natural	   Gas,	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-­‐oil.htm	  17	  	   R.S.	  Kalha.,	  op.	  cit.	  18	  	   Mokhzani	   Zubir,	   The	   Strategic	   Value	   of	   the	   Strait	   of	   Malacca,	   accessed	   from	  http://www.aspirasi-­‐ndp.com/en/archive/ThestrategicvalueoftheStraitofMalacca.pdf	   on	   5	  December	  2011.	  	  19	  	   “Global	   Oil	   Choke	   Points,	   How	   Vulnerable	   Is	   the	   Global	   Oil	   Market?”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf	  20	  	   Richard	   A.	   Bitzinger,	   “The	   China	   Syndromes:	   Chinese	   Military	   Modernization	   and	   the	  Rearming	  of	   Southeast	  Asia,”	   in	  Working	  Paper	  no.	   126,	   Singapore:	   S.	  Rajaratnam	  School	   of	  International	  Studies,	  May	  2007.	  	  21	  	   “China	   Buys	   Air	   Defense	   Systems	   from	   Russia,”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/02/us-­‐russia-­‐china-­‐arms-­‐idUSTRE6310WG20100402	  22	  	   “China	   Launches	   First	   Aircraft	   Carrier	   on	   Maiden	   Sea	   Trial,”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/us-­‐china-­‐military-­‐carrier-­‐idUSTRE77900D20110810	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Although China reaffirms that her arms build-up is aimed to “safeguard its 
national sovereignty, security and interests of national development,” its neighbors 
may view its policy differently. Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, particularly, 
perceive this action as a threat. In 2009 Vietnam Defence Paper, for example. 
Although Vietnam did not clearly mention about China, it noticed that territorial 
disputes over South China Sea have been more complicated and on the rise. 
According to Vietnam government, this is primarily due to many major powers have 
adjusted their military strategies, increased their defence budgets, speeded up the 
armed forces modernization, and developed advanced weapons and equipment, as 
well as military technologies.23 This, of course, made the situation in South China Sea 
more complicated. 
Similarly, Japan has viewed China’s arms build-up, particularly in navy 
capabilities, as a threat since they remain had the East China Sea dispute to settle. This 
is as written in Japan’s Defence Paper 2010: 
“In its military modernization China appears to give particular 
priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for 
the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s 
independence and others, but in recent years, China has begun to 
work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan 
issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in 
the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a major 
political and economic power in the region.”24 
 
Regarding this issue, a retired Lieutenant General and Corps Commander of Japan’s 
Northern Army, who later became a professor at Teikyo University, says, “We do not 
have any concern about their land forces, only maritime forces like the navy and 
missiles. A drastic expansion of that kind of capability could be a threat in the 
future.”25  
China’s policy with regard to its military modernization and South China Sea 
issue, to a greater extent, has led its neighbors to react in a similar strategy. As 
confirmed in its Defence Policy, Vietnam has developed its defence powers and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 	  “The	   2009	   Vietnam	   National	   Defence	   Paper,”	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/vietnamnationaldefence%28vietnamwhitepapers-­‐nd-­‐14440.html?cid=236	  24	  	   Japan’s	   Defense	   White	   Paper	   –	   2010	   accessed	   from	  http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf	  25	  	   “Japan	  Moves	   on	   from	   the	   Cold	  War,”	   accessed	   from	   http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐asia-­‐pacific-­‐12015563,	  in	  13	  September	  2011.	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closely coordinated defence-security and diplomatic activities in the last decade. This 
is carried out for two reasons; to protect its sovereignty as well as to support its 
military industrialization and modernization. The Vietnam People’s Army 
modernization is performed by a significant increase in Vietnam’s Defence budget. 
The 2006 defence budget was increased 20.89% from USD 781.34 million to USD 
987.70 million. It was then increased 28.85% in 2007 and became USD 1,388.26 
million. It was slightly decreased in 2008, but then dramatically increased to become 
USD 2,6 billion in 2011 and USD 3,3 billion in 2012.26  
Like Vietnam, the Philippines have also established a reformation in its defence 
strategy since 2003. Under the Philippines Defence Reform, the government focuses 
on 10 key areas, such as improvement of operational and training capacity, 
improvement of logistics capacity, personnel management systems, and level 
expertise, optimizing the defence budget and improving management controls, and 
also increasing the capability of the Armed Forces of Philippines to conduct civil 
military operations.27 Initially, along with the US, the defence reform is directed to 
respond the 9/11 terrorist’s attack. Yet, the program is specifically containing the 
mission to protect the Philippines national territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone 
from external aggression and transnational threats.28  
The Philippines has also performed an assertive stand towards China, with 
regard to Scarborough Shoal issue since 1994. A recent standoff has just ensued when 
a Philippine navy surveillance plane sighted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored in 
a lagoon at Scarborough on April 8. Based on a report form Filipino sailors, the 
Philippines navy then deployed its largest warship, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar to the 
region.29 The Philippines later withdrew its warship, but China sent out two Fishery 
Law Enforcement Command vessels. China’s act obviously provokes standoff to 
escalate, with the Philippines requesting a diplomatic resolution to the crisis but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  	  The	   2009	   Vietnam	   National	   Defence	   Paper,	   pp.	   38;	   see	   also	   http://defense-­‐studies.blogspot.com/2011/01/vietnam-­‐defense-­‐budget-­‐in-­‐2011.html	   and	   http://defense-­‐studies.blogspot.com/2011/11/vietnam-­‐announces-­‐2012-­‐defence-­‐budget.html	  27	  	   Philippines	   Defense	   Reform,	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm	  28	  	   Charles	  ‘Ken’	  Comer,	  “Philippines	  Defense	  Reform,	  Are	  We	  There	  Yet?”	  can	  be	  accessed	  from	  http://www.google.co.id/search?q=philippines+defense+reform&ie=utf-­‐8&oe=utf-­‐8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-­‐US:official&client=firefox-­‐a	  29	  	   “Philippine	   Warship	   in	   Standoff	   with	   China	   Vessels,”	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/11/philippines-­‐china-­‐stand-­‐off-­‐south-­‐china-­‐sea	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refusing to retreat.  Bilateral relations have quickly deteriorated, as China introduces 
restrictions on imports of Philippine bananas and calls on tour groups to leave, 
causing a severe blow to the Philippine economy.  Moreover, the Chinese media is 
talking of war and provoking both citizens, although a fishing ban implemented by 
both sides may let tensions subside.30  
 
 
ASEAN’s approaches in South China Sea Dispute 
Rooted from its history, ASEAN obviously has its nature and origins. The national 
circumstances and inter-state relationships of its members has shaped ASEAN as an 
association and set the so-called “ASEAN Way.” This is to mention the loose 
arrangements over legal instruments and binding agreements, the principle of non-
interference, a pace comfortable to all member states and way of consensus in its 
decision making process. In addition, to dispel the notion that ASEAN was intended 
to be some kind of defence pact or military alliance, ASEAN has been devoted 
principally to economic, social and cultural cooperation. 31  However, as former 
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew said in his memoirs, in its development, 
ASEAN was banding together more for political objectives, stability and security.32  
With regard to this security and stability matters, ASEAN later had initiatives to 
seek solutions on the South China Sea dispute. There are at least two reasons that 
pulled ASEAN to pay attention on the issue. Firstly, the dispute on the South China 
Sea involved its member states namely Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the 
Philippines. As far as it is concerned, the contention involves sensitive questions of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of its claimants. Secondly, as previously mentioned, the 
dispute gives implications for national and regional security as well as economic 
development.  
Accordingly, on July 1992, shortly after Vietnam acceded the ASEAN Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting surprisingly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	   ‘The	   Scarborough	   Shoal	   Standoff”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.currentintelligence.net/analysis/2012/5/17/the-­‐scarborough-­‐shoal-­‐standoff.html;	   see	   also	   “Chinese	   Media	   Warns	   of	   War	   with	   Philippines”	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/9258225/Chinese-­‐media-­‐warns-­‐of-­‐war-­‐with-­‐Philippines.html	  31	  	   Rodolfo	  C.	  Severino,	  Southeast	  Asia	  in	  Search	  of	  an	  ASEAN	  Community:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Former	  
ASEAN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Singapore,	  ISEAS,	  2006,	  pp.	  1-­‐37,	  and	  161.	  32	  	   Lee	  Kuan	  Yew,	  From	  Third	  World	  to	  First	  –	  The	  Singapore	  Story:	  1965	  –	  2000,	  Singapore:	  Times	  Media	  Private	  Limited,	  2000,	  p.	  370.	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agreed to issue a security-related Declaration of the South China Sea. Essentially, it 
called for a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, without resort to force, the 
exercise of restraint, possible cooperation in maritime safety, environmental 
protection, search and rescue and action against piracy, robbery at sea and drug-
trafficking. 33  In the meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers also praised the 
Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, initiated and 
hosted by Indonesia, as it contributed to a better understanding of the issues. 34  
Moreover, ASEAN has sought to deal regarding the South China Sea issues on 
multilateral basis with China. However, China consistently refused as Chinese 
government offered to solve the sovereignty issue and to negotiate joint development 
agreements on a bilateral basis. 35  Eventually in 1994, ASEAN-China Dialogue 
marked the first time in history that China consented to multilateral negotiations. 
Craig Snyder remarked that the multilateral approach has proven some success in the 
South China Sea through joint development and increased transparency among the 
claimants.36  
In a critical situation, in which four ASEAN members have conflicting claims to 
all or parts of South China Sea, ASEAN has also developed a united posture in 
dealing with China. The political solidarity posture was further manifested in 
November 2002, when the government of ASEAN’s member states and the 
government of China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea.37 Moreover, as the dispute between China and ASEAN came out into the 
open during the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, ASEAN reached a 
consensus with China to discuss a joint development of undersea resources. 38 ASEAN 
and China later agreed to adopt a set of guidelines to implement the declaration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  	   “ASEAN	  Declaration	  on	  The	  South	  China	  Sea,	  Manila,	  Philippines,	  22	  July	  1992”	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	  http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm	  34	  	   “Joint	   Communique	   25th	   ASEAN	   Ministerial	   Meeting	   Manila,	   Philippines,	   21-­‐22	   July	   1992,	  point	  17”	  accessed	  from	  http://www.aseansec.org/1167.htm	  35	  	   Epsey	   Cooke	   Farrel,	  The	  Socialist	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  and	   the	  Law	  of	   the	  Sea:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  
Vietnamese	   Behavior	   within	   the	   Emerging	   International	   Oceans	   Regime,	   Cambridge:	   Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  1998,	  p.	  282.	  36	  	   Craig	   Snyder	   comment	   in	   the	   Conference	   Report	   of	   “The	   South	   China	   Sea:	   Towards	   a	  Cooperative	  Management	  Regime,”	  May	  16-­‐17,	  2007,	  Singapore.	  
37	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Conduct	   of	   Parties	   in	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm	  38 	  “ASEAN:	   a	   united	   front	   to	   tackle	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   issue,”	   accessed	   form	  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/13/asean-­‐a-­‐united-­‐front-­‐to-­‐tackle-­‐the-­‐south-­‐china-­‐sea-­‐issue/	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conduct, and pledged to exercise restraint. Building on this progress, ASEAN senior 
officials have met several times since late 2011 to discuss a code of conduct on South 
China Sea matters. 
In January 2012, one of the claimants, the Philippines circulated an informal 
working draft simply titled, Philippines Draft Code of Conduct. The document was 
eight pages in length and comprised ten articles. In line with official Philippine 
foreign policy promoting the South China Sea as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, 
Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). The draft of CoC proposed a Joint 
Cooperation Area in the South China Sea (Article III), a Joint Permanent Working 
Committee to implement the ZOPFF/C (Article IV), the Application of Part IX of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea in the South China Sea (Article 
V), and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (Article VI). The remaining articles 
contained standard provisions such as principles (Article I), objectives (Article II), 
reservations (Article VII), signature and ratification (Article VIII), entry into force 
(Article IX) and review and amendments to the code (Article X).39  
The non-claimant state such as Indonesia also took the initiative to promulgate a 
CoC comprising confidence building and conflict prevention measures and conflict 
management measures, should conflict or an incident arise. This is essentially to 
prevent situations from worsening. Indonesia has also circulated a draft of CoC on the 
South China Sea to ASEAN foreign ministers in last September 2012. According to 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, the CoC draft will be further 
consulted by ASEAN Ministers before the ASEAN Summit November 2012.40   
Notwithstanding, the situation in the waters remains vulnerable. There are three 
arguments to support this statement. Firstly, any moves by any of the claimants, could 
become more and more sensitive and could agitate the area at any time. As Severino 
concluded, the issues are much too complex and their implications are much too great 
for the vital national interests of the countries involved.41  
ASEAN-China dialogue may significantly improve their mutual understanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  	   Carlyle	   A.	   Thayer,	   “ASEAN’S	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   in	   the	   South	   China	   Sea:	   A	   Litmus	   Test	   for	  Community-­‐Building?”	  accessed	  from	  http://www.japanfocus.org/-­‐Carlyle_A_-­‐Thayer/3813	  40	  	   “RI	   circulates	   draft	   code	   of	   conduct	   on	   South	   China	   Sea,”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/29/ri-­‐circulates-­‐draft-­‐code-­‐conduct-­‐south-­‐china-­‐sea.html	  41	  	   Severino,	  op.	  cit.,	  p	  189.	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and confidence about the issue. However, the turning point in a long and complicated 
conflict, the conversion from bilateralism to multilateralism, and the renunciation of 
the use of force according to some observers led countries to conflict prevention rather 
than conflict resolution.42  In the meantime, ASEAN and China have been trying to 
exercise self-restraint, refrain from occupying any more territory, avoid any acts that 
could shake the stability of the area, build mutual confidence, and cooperate in dealing 
with matters that call for cooperation and yield common benefits to the cooperating 
parties. Yet, the territorial jurisdiction dispute itself remains unsolved.  
Secondly, the contention between four ASEAN members as claimants of South 
China Sea, coupled with China, has failed the “ASEAN Way” to reach consensus. For 
the first time in ASEAN's history, the 10 members have failed to issue a joint 
communiqué at the end of its summit in Phnom Penh, 13 July 2012. With a sharply 
disagreeable of the issue, most likely any consensus regarding this dispute will 
become very difficult to achieve, if it is not impossible.  
As a matter of fact, the whole issue of South China Sea is clearly not an issue 
between ASEAN as an organization and China. It is rather a judicial and sovereignty 
matter between claimants. Although Indonesia's foreign minister Marty Natalegawa 
said that ASEAN should be seen to be acting as one,43 the unity is needed merely to 
maintain the peace and stability of the region. ASEAN has to make sure that any 
bilateral agreements regarding the territorial dispute will neither provoke other 
claimants nor constrain other ASEAN countries to utilize their freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea and its adjacent waters. 
Eventually, as the former Indonesian Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono 
mentioned that along with its both economic and military development, China is most 
likely refusing to submit to international laws.44 This also applies to the DoC and CoC 
on South China Sea issue. China will utilize its capacity entirely to place itself in a 
stronger bargaining position against other claimants, including with ASEAN member-
states. With this condition, the South China Sea dispute settlement seems to take a 
longer time than predicted. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  	   Jason	  Ray	  Hutchison,	  op.	  cit.	  	  43 	  “ASEAN	   summit	   fails	   to	   agree	   on	   concluding	   joint	   statement,”	   accessed	   from	  http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/1213369/1/.html	  44	  	   “Tiru	  AS,	  China	  Tak	  Akan	  Tunduk	  Aturan	  Internasional,”	  (Emulating	  the	  US,	  China	  Refuses	  to	  Submit	  to	  International	  Laws.)	  Kompas,	  Saturday,	  6	  October	  2012,	  p.	  10	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Conclusion  
The South China Sea issue has called ASEAN for a significant role to resolve. The 
joint communiqués discussing the South China Sea issue between ASEAN’s ministers 
has been held many times. However, the last communiqué performed the failure of 
ASEAN’s way of consensus. Moreover, the dialogue between ASEAN states and 
China is nothing more than to build a mutual confidence and conflict prevention. 
Although China performs its peaceful diplomacy with its neighbors, it remains 
utilized its military for sovereignty protection. ASEAN may not have the capability to 
resolve the judicial dispute, yet it has the responsibility to maintain peace and stability 
to the region. As a regional association, ASEAN has to protect its members’ interests. 
However, ASEAN and ASEAN countries might utilize both multilateral and bilateral 
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